Lecturers: Eric Pacuit ( website) and Olivier Roy ( website)NEWS
We hope you enjoyed the course! Please email us with any comments your questions that you might have about the material discussed during the course.
Venue: European Summer School for Logic, Language and Information
(ESSLLI 2012)
Meeting Times: August 6  10, 11:00  12:30
(Day 1, Day 2, Day 3, Day 4, Day 5)
Location: Opole, Poland
Overview
Game Theory studies rational decision making in situations of interdependent decisions, where the outcome of one's choice depends on what others decide. "Real" games like chess or Go are obvious examples, but gametheoretical models have proved useful to analyze a much broader range of phenomena, from bargaining situations, both by real and artificial agents, to conventions like driving behavior and language. In such situations, rational deliberation about what to do should take into account not only what one expects the others will do, but also what one believes about others' beliefs. Taking this intuition seriously is the trademark of contemporary *epistemic* game theory, a discipline that has by now a few decades of fruitful interaction between logic and economics on its record.
This course is a general introduction to epistemic game theory, with a strong accent on logical approaches to the discipline. We will start by introducing the decisiontheoretic background, as well as the gametheoretical basics. We will then move to epistemic game theory proper, by presenting modern logical tools to represent information in interactive contexts, and looking in detail at the classic results in the field, both on socalled strategic form games, "matrices", and extensive form games, "trees". Towards the end of the course, we will connect with the more recent logical literature on information (dynamics), preferences and actions, showing that they offer a new perspective on the gametheoretic results.
The course should be of interest for students in philosophy, computer science (especially multiagent systems) and linguistics (especially those interested in formal pragmatics). It will be selfcontained, thus does not require previous knowledge of the logical or game and decisiontheoretical material that we will cover. We only assume a reasonable level of mathematical maturity.
Reading Material
The course is roughly based on the following forthcoming article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy. Epistemic Game Theory, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (forthcoming).
 Adam Brandenburger (2007). The Power of Paradox: Some Recent Developments in Interactive Epistemology, International Journal of Game Theory, 35, pgs. 465  492.
 Pierpaolo Battigalli and Giacomo Bonanno (2009). Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory, Research in Economics, 53:2 pgs. 149  225.
 Oliver Board (2002). Knowledge, Beliefs and GameTheoretic Solution Concepts, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 18, pgs. 433  445.
 K.R. Apt (2011). A Primer on Strategic Games, in Lectures in Game Theory for Computer Scientists, Cambridge University Press, pgs. 1  33.
 Kevin LeytonBrown and Yoav Shoham (2008). Essentials of Game Theory, Morgan & Claypool Publishers.
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Schedule
Below is a schedule for the course (which is subject to change) that will contain links to any handouts, slides and relevant papers for each lecture.Date  Topic 

Day 1 August 6, 2012 
Slides Handout Topics We introduced the basic concepts in game and decision theory (strategic and extensive games, Nash equilibrium, iterated strict/weak dominance, maximizing expected utility). Primary Sources

Day 2 August 7, 2012 
Slides Topics: We started with a discussion of the relationship between dominance reasoning and maximizing expected utility. The main focus of the lecture was to introduce various mathematical models that describe the players' knowledge and beliefs. Reading

Day 3 August 8, 2012 
Slides Proof from the Apt and Zvesper paper Topics We finished our discussion of epistemic notions (knowledge, belief, "safe" belief, common knowledge/belief). The main topic for today was a fundamental theorem of epistemic game theory: informally, assuming rationality and common belief of rationality implies that the players choose strategies that survive iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies. Reading

Day 4 August 9, 2012 
Slides Topics We continue our discussion of epistemic characterizations of solutions concepts. The first part of the lecture focused on extensive games and backwards induction. The second part discussed the characterization of iterated weak dominance. Reading

Day 5 August 10, 2012 
Slides Topics We conclude with a discussion of the BrandenburgerKeisler Paradox, Nash Equilibrium and normative vs. descriptive models of games. Reading

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Additional Information
loriweb.org: a web portal with a number of important resources (call for papers, conference announcements, available positions, general discussions, etc.).
Recent courses and seminars (contains links to relevant papers)
Recent courses and seminars (contains links to relevant papers)
 Andreas Perea's course on Epistemic Game Theory (Maastricht University)
 Eric Pacuit, Rationality (Tilburg University, Spring 2011)
 Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy, Logic, Interaction and Collective Agency (ESSLLI 2010 Course)
 DGL: Decisions, Games and Logic, an annual conference on the intersection of decision theory, game theory and logic.
 LGS: Logic, Games and Social Choice, a biannual conference focusing primarily on logic and social choice theory
 TARK: Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge is a biannual conference on the interdisciplinary issues involving reasoning about rationality, knowledge and game theory.
 LOFT: Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory is a biannual conference which focuses, in part, on applications of formal epistemology in game and decision theory.