

Neighborhood Semantics for Modal Logic

Lecture 5

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- ✓ Introduction, Motivation and Background Information
- ✓ Basic Concepts, Non-normal Modal Logics, Completeness, Incompleteness, Relation with Relational Semantics
- ✓ Decidability/Complexity, Related Semantics: Topological Semantics for Modal Logic, More on the Relation with Relational Semantics, Subset Models, First-order Modal Logic
- ✓ Some Model Theory: Monotonic Modal Logic, Model Constructions, First-Order Correspondent Language

Lecture 5: Neighborhood Semantics in Action: Game Logic, Coalgebra, Common Knowledge

What is the relationship between Neighborhood and other Semantics for Modal Logic? What about First-Order Modal Logic?

Can we import results/ideas from model theory for modal logic with respect to Kripke Semantics/Topological Semantics?

Monotonic Bisimulation

Let $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, N, V \rangle$ and $\mathfrak{M}' = \langle W', N', V' \rangle$ be two monotonic neighborhood models. A relation $Z \subseteq W \times W'$ is a **bisimulation** provided whenever wZw' :

Atomic harmony: for each $p \in \text{At}$, $w \in V(p)$ iff $w' \in V'(p)$

Zig: If $X \in N(w)$ then there is an $X' \subseteq W'$ such that

$$X' \in N'(w') \text{ and } \forall x' \in X' \exists x \in X \text{ such that } xZx'$$

Zag: If $X' \in N'(w')$ then there is an $X \subseteq W$ such that

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Lemma

On *locally core-finite* models, if $\mathbb{M}, w \rightsquigarrow \mathbb{M}', w'$ then $\mathbb{M}, w \leftrightarrow \mathbb{M}', w'$.

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Theorem

A \mathcal{L}_2 formula $\alpha(x)$ is invariant for monotonic bisimulation, then $\alpha(x)$ is equivalent to $st_x^{\text{mon}}(\varphi)$ for some $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$.

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M. Pauly. *Bisimulation for Non-normal Modal Logic*. 1999.

H. Hansen. *Monotonic Modal Logic*. 2003.

Do monotonic bisimulations work when we drop monotonicity? **No!**

Definition

Two points w_1 from \mathfrak{F}_1 and w_2 from \mathfrak{F}_2 are **behaviorally equivalent** provided there is a neighborhood frame \mathfrak{F} and bounded morphisms $f : \mathfrak{F}_1 \rightarrow \mathfrak{F}$ and $g : \mathfrak{F}_2 \rightarrow \mathfrak{F}$ such that $f(w_1) = g(w_2)$.

Theorem

Over the class **N** (of neighborhood models), the following are equivalent:

- ▶ $\alpha(x)$ is equivalent to the translation of a modal formula
- ▶ $\alpha(x)$ is invariant under behavioural equivalence.

H. Hansen, C. Kupke and EP. *Bisimulation for Neighborhood Structures*.
CALCO 2007.

The Language \mathcal{L}_2

The language \mathcal{L}_2 is built from the following grammar:

$$x = y \mid u = v \mid P_i x \mid x N u \mid u E x \mid \neg \varphi \mid \varphi \wedge \psi \mid \exists x \varphi \mid \exists u \varphi$$

$\mathfrak{M} = \langle D, \{P_i \mid i \in \omega\}, N, E \rangle$ where

- ▶ $D = D^s \cup D^n$ (and $D^s \cap D^n = \emptyset$),
- ▶ $Q_i \subseteq D^s$,
- ▶ $N \subseteq D^s \times D^n$ and
- ▶ $E \subseteq D^n \times D^s$.

The Language \mathcal{L}_2

Definition

Let $\mathfrak{M} = \langle S, N, V \rangle$ be a neighbourhood model. The *first-order translation* of \mathfrak{M} is the structure $\mathfrak{M}^\circ = \langle D, \{P_i \mid i \in \omega\}, R_N, R_\exists \rangle$ where

- ▶ $D^s = S, D^n = \bigcup_{s \in S} N(s)$
- ▶ For each $i \in \omega, P_i = V(p_i)$
- ▶ $R_N = \{(s, U) \mid s \in D^s, U \in N(s)\}$
- ▶ $R_\exists = \{(U, s) \mid s \in D^s, s \in U\}$

The Language \mathcal{L}_2

Definition

The *standard translation* of the basic modal language are functions $st_x : \mathcal{L} \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_2$ defined as follows as follows: $st_x(p_i) = P_i x$, st_x commutes with boolean connectives and

$$st_x(\Box\varphi) = \exists u(xR_N u \wedge (\forall y(uR_{\exists} y \leftrightarrow st_y(\varphi))))$$

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Lemma

Let \mathfrak{M} be a neighbourhood structure and $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$. For each $s \in S$, $\mathfrak{M}, s \models \varphi$ iff $\mathfrak{M}^\circ \models st_x(\varphi)[s]$.

$\mathbf{N} = \{\mathfrak{M} \mid \mathfrak{M} \cong \mathfrak{M}^\circ \text{ for some neighbourhood model } \mathfrak{M}\}$

(A1) $\exists x(x = x)$

(A2) $\forall u \exists x(x R_N u)$

(A3) $\forall u, v(\neg(u = v) \rightarrow$
 $\exists x((u R_{\exists} x \wedge \neg v R_{\exists} x) \vee (\neg u R_{\exists} x \wedge v R_{\exists} x)))$

Theorem

Suppose \mathfrak{M} is an \mathcal{L}_2 -structure. Then there is a neighbourhood structure \mathfrak{M}_\circ such that $\mathfrak{M} \cong (\mathfrak{M}_\circ)^\circ$.

Theorem

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CALCO 2007.

What can we infer from the fact that bi-modal normal modal logic can simulate non-normal modal logics?

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Can we read off a notion of bisimulation? **Not clear.**

- ▶ Decidability of the satisfiability problem
- ▶ Canonicity
- ▶ Salqvist Theorem
- ▶ ????

O. Gasquet and A. Herzig. *From Classical to Normal Modal Logic*. .

M. Kracht and F. Wolter. *Normal Monomodal Logics can Simulate all Others*
. .

H. Hansen (Chapter 10). *Monotonic Modal Logics*. 2003.

Theorem The McKinsey Axiom is canonical with respect to neighborhood semantics.

T. Surendonk. *Canonicity for Intensional Logics with Even Axioms*. JSL 2001.

Tableaux

There are tableaux for non-normal modal logics.

H. Hansen. *Tableau Games for Coalition Logic and Alternating-Time Temporal Logic*. 2004.

G. Governatori and A. Luppi. *Labelled Tableaux for Non-Normal Modal Logics*. Advances in AI (2000).

Tableaux

There are tableaux for non-normal modal logics.

The tableau rule for **K**:

$$\frac{\Phi \circ \Box\psi, \Psi}{\Phi^\# \circ \psi}$$

where $\Phi^\# = \{\varphi \mid \Box\varphi \in \Phi\}$

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Algebra

- ▶ Categories of relational frames are dual to categories of Boolean algebras with *normal* operators. (arrows are bounded morphisms)

Y. Venema. *Algebras and Coalgebras*. Handbook of Modal Logic (2006).

Algebra

- ▶ Categories of relational frames are dual to categories of Boolean algebras with *normal* operators. (arrows are bounded morphisms)
- ▶ Categories of neighborhood frames are dual to categories of Boolean algebras with arbitrary operators.

Kosta Dosen. *Duality Between Modal Algebras and Neighborhood Frames*. Studia Logica (1987).

Y. Venema. *Algebras and Coalgebras*. Handbook of Modal Logic (2006).

Coalgebra

A **Coalgebra** for a functor F in a category C is a pair $\langle A, \alpha \rangle$ where A is an object of C and $\alpha : A \rightarrow FA$.

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Examples:

- ▶ $\mathcal{C} \times X$: streams over \mathcal{C}
- ▶ $2 \times X^{\mathcal{C}}$: deterministic automata with input alphabet \mathcal{C}
- ▶ $\wp(\mathcal{C} \times X)$: labeled transition systems
- ▶ $(1 + \Delta(X))^{\mathcal{C}}$: probabilistic transition systems

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The **contravariant power set functor** 2 is the functor that maps a set X to the set $\wp(X)$ of subsets of X and a function $f : X \rightarrow Y$ to the inverse image functions $f^{-1} : \wp(Y) \rightarrow \wp(X)$ given by $f^{-1}[U] := \{x \in X \mid f(x) \in U\}$.

The functor 2^2 is defined as the composition $2 \circ 2$ of 2 with itself.

Neighbourhood frames are coalgebras for the functor 2^2 .

Y. Venema. *Algebras and Coalgebras*. Handbook of Modal Logic (2006).

Common Belief/Knowledge in Non-Normal Modal Logics

It is possible to separate the two definitions of common belief (knowledge) as a least fixed point and infinite iteration using neighborhood models.

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It is possible to separate the two definitions of common belief (knowledge) as a least fixed point and infinite iteration using neighborhood models.

There are non-normal logics with a common belief (knowledge) operator that are sound and **strongly** complete.

A. Heifetz. *Common belief in monotonic epistemic logic*. Mathematical Social Sciences (1999).

Lismont and Mongin. *Strong Completeness Theorems for Weak Logics of Common Beliefs*. JPL (2003).

J. van Benthem and D. Saraenac. *Geometry of Knowledge*. 2004.

Background: Propositional Dynamic Logic

Let P be a set of atomic programs and At a set of atomic propositions.

Formulas of **PDL** have the following syntactic form:

$$\varphi := p \mid \perp \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \psi \mid [\alpha]\varphi$$

$$\alpha := a \mid \alpha \cup \beta \mid \alpha; \beta \mid \alpha^* \mid \varphi?$$

where $p \in At$ and $a \in P$.

$[\alpha]\varphi$ is intended to mean “after executing the program α , φ is true”

Background: Propositional Dynamic Logic

Semantics: $\mathcal{M} = \langle W, \{R_a \mid a \in P\}, V \rangle$ where for each $a \in P$, $R_a \subseteq W \times W$ and $V : \text{At} \rightarrow \wp(W)$

- ▶ $R_{\alpha \cup \beta} := R_\alpha \cup R_\beta$
- ▶ $R_{\alpha; \beta} := R_\alpha \circ R_\beta$
- ▶ $R_{\alpha^*} := \bigcup_{n \geq 0} R_\alpha^n$
- ▶ $R_{\varphi?} = \{(w, w) \mid \mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi\}$

$\mathcal{M}, w \models [\alpha]\varphi$ iff for each v , if $wR_\alpha v$ then $\mathcal{M}, v \models \varphi$

Background: Propositional Dynamic Logic

1. Axioms of propositional logic
2. $[\alpha](\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ([\alpha]\varphi \rightarrow [\alpha]\psi)$
3. $[\alpha \cup \beta]\varphi \leftrightarrow [\alpha]\varphi \wedge [\beta]\varphi$
4. $[\alpha; \beta]\varphi \leftrightarrow [\alpha][\beta]\varphi$
5. $[\psi?]\varphi \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$
6. $\varphi \wedge [\alpha][\alpha^*]\varphi \leftrightarrow [\alpha^*]\varphi$
7. $\varphi \wedge [\alpha^*](\varphi \rightarrow [\alpha]\varphi) \rightarrow [\alpha^*]\varphi$
8. Modus Ponens and Necessitation (for each program α)

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4. $[\alpha; \beta]\varphi \leftrightarrow [\alpha][\beta]\varphi$
5. $[\psi?]\varphi \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$
6. $\varphi \wedge [\alpha][\alpha^*]\varphi \leftrightarrow [\alpha^*]\varphi$ (Fixed-Point Axiom)
7. $\varphi \wedge [\alpha^*](\varphi \rightarrow [\alpha]\varphi) \rightarrow [\alpha^*]\varphi$ (Induction Axiom)
8. Modus Ponens and Necessitation (for each program α)

Background: Propositional Dynamic Logic

Theorem PDL is sound and weakly complete with respect to the Segerberg Axioms.

Theorem The satisfiability problem for **PDL** is decidable (EXPTIME-Complete).

D. Kozen and R. Parikh. *A Completeness proof for Propositional Dynamic Logic*. .

D. Harel, D. Kozen and Tiuryn. *Dynamic Logic*. 2001.

Concurrent Programs

D. Peleg. *Concurrent Dynamic Logic*. JACM (1987).

Concurrent Programs

$\alpha \cap \beta$ is intended to mean “execute α and β in parallel”.

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Concurrent Programs

$\alpha \cap \beta$ is intended to mean “execute α and β in parallel”.

In PDL: $R_\alpha \subseteq W \times W$, where $wR_\alpha v$ means executing α in state w leads to state v .

D. Peleg. *Concurrent Dynamic Logic*. JACM (1987).

Concurrent Programs

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In PDL: $R_\alpha \subseteq W \times W$, where $wR_\alpha v$ means executing α in state w leads to state v .

With Concurrent Programs: $R_\alpha \subseteq W \times \wp(W)$, where $wR_\alpha V$ means executing α in parallel from state w to reach all states in V .

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$w \models \langle \alpha \rangle \varphi$ iff $\exists U$ such that $(w, U) \in R_\alpha$ and $\forall v \in U, v \models \varphi$.

$$R_{\alpha \cap \beta} := \{(w, V) \mid \exists U, U', (w, U) \in R_\alpha, (w, U') \in R_\beta, V = U \cup U'\}$$

D. Peleg. *Concurrent Dynamic Logic*. JACM (1987).

From **PDL** to Game Logic

R. Parikh. *The Logic of Games and its Applications..* Annals of Discrete Mathematics. (1985) .

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Main Idea:

In **PDL**: $w \models \langle \pi \rangle \varphi$: there is a run of the program π starting in state w that ends in a state where φ is true.

The programs in **PDL** can be thought of as *single player games*.

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Game Logic generalized **PDL** by considering two players:

In **GL**: $w \models \langle \gamma \rangle \varphi$: Angel has a **strategy** in the game γ to ensure that the game ends in a state where φ is true.

From **PDL** to Game Logic

Consequences of two players:

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$\langle \gamma \rangle \varphi$: Angel has a strategy in γ to ensure φ is true

$[\gamma] \varphi$: Demon has a strategy in γ to ensure φ is true

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But not both: $\neg(\langle \gamma \rangle \varphi \wedge [\gamma] \neg \varphi)$

From PDL to Game Logic

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Thus, $[\gamma] \varphi \leftrightarrow \neg \langle \gamma \rangle \neg \varphi$ is a valid principle

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But not both: $\neg(\langle \gamma \rangle \varphi \wedge [\gamma] \neg \varphi)$

Thus, $[\gamma] \varphi \leftrightarrow \neg \langle \gamma \rangle \neg \varphi$ is a valid principle

However, $[\gamma] \varphi \wedge [\gamma] \psi \rightarrow [\gamma](\varphi \wedge \psi)$ is **not** a valid principle

From PDL to Game Logic

Reinterpret operations and invent new ones:

- ▶ $?\varphi$: Check whether φ currently holds
- ▶ $\gamma_1; \gamma_2$: First play γ_1 then γ_2
- ▶ $\gamma_1 \cup \gamma_2$: Angel choose between γ_1 and γ_2
- ▶ γ^* : Angel can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time she has played γ , she can decide whether to play it again or not.
- ▶ γ^d : Switch roles, then play γ
- ▶ $\gamma_1 \cap \gamma_2 := (\gamma_1^d \cup \gamma_2^d)^d$: Demon chooses between γ_1 and γ_2
- ▶ $\gamma^x := ((\gamma^d)^*)^d$: Demon can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time he has played γ , he can decide whether to play it again or not.

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Game Logic

Syntax

Let Γ_0 be a set of atomic games and At a set of atomic propositions. Then formulas of Game Logic are defined inductively as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma &:= g \mid \varphi? \mid \gamma; \gamma \mid \gamma \cup \gamma \mid \gamma^* \mid \gamma^d \\ \varphi &:= \perp \mid p \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \vee \varphi \mid \langle \gamma \rangle \varphi \mid [\gamma] \varphi \end{aligned}$$

where $p \in At, g \in \Gamma_0$.

Game Logic

A **neighborhood game model** is a tuple $\mathcal{M} = \langle W, \{E_g \mid g \in \Gamma_0\}, V \rangle$ where

W is a nonempty set of states

For each $g \in \Gamma_0$, $E_g : W \rightarrow \wp(\wp(W))$ is a monotonic neighborhood function.

$X \in E_g(w)$ means in state s , Angel has a strategy to force the game to end in *some* state in X (we may write $wE_g X$)

$V : At \rightarrow \wp(W)$ is a valuation function.

Game Logic

Propositional letters and boolean connectives are as usual.

$$\mathcal{M}, w \models \langle \gamma \rangle \varphi \text{ iff } (\varphi)^{\mathcal{M}} \in E_{\gamma}(w)$$

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Suppose $E_{\gamma}(Y) := \{s \mid Y \in E_g(s)\}$

- ▶ $E_{\gamma_1; \gamma_2}(Y) := E_{\gamma_1}(E_{\gamma_2}(Y))$
- ▶ $E_{\gamma_1 \cup \gamma_2}(Y) := E_{\gamma_1}(Y) \cup E_{\gamma_2}(Y)$
- ▶ $E_{\varphi?}(Y) := (\varphi)^{\mathcal{M}} \cap Y$
- ▶ $E_{\gamma^d}(Y) := \overline{E_{\gamma}(Y)}$
- ▶ $E_{\gamma^*}(Y) := \mu X. Y \cup E_{\gamma}(X)$

Game Logic: Axioms

1. All propositional tautologies
2. $\langle \alpha; \beta \rangle \varphi \leftrightarrow \langle \alpha \rangle \langle \beta \rangle \varphi$ Composition
3. $\langle \alpha \cup \beta \rangle \varphi \leftrightarrow \langle \alpha \rangle \varphi \vee \langle \beta \rangle \varphi$ Union
4. $\langle \psi? \rangle \varphi \leftrightarrow (\psi \wedge \varphi)$ Test
5. $\langle \alpha^d \rangle \varphi \leftrightarrow \neg \langle \alpha \rangle \neg \varphi$ Dual
6. $(\varphi \vee \langle \alpha \rangle \langle \alpha^* \rangle \varphi) \rightarrow \langle \alpha^* \rangle \varphi$ Mix

and the rules,

$$\frac{\varphi \quad \varphi \rightarrow \psi}{\psi}$$

$$\frac{\varphi \rightarrow \psi}{\langle \alpha \rangle \varphi \rightarrow \langle \alpha \rangle \psi}$$

$$\frac{(\varphi \vee \langle \alpha \rangle \psi) \rightarrow \psi}{\langle \alpha^* \rangle \varphi \rightarrow \psi}$$

Game Logic

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Game Logic

- ▶ Game Logic is more expressive than **PDL**

$$\langle (g^d)^* \rangle \perp$$

- ▶ The induction axiom is not valid in GL.

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- ▶ All GL games are determined.

Game Logic

Theorem Dual-free game logic is sound and complete with respect to the class of all game models.

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Open Question Is (full) game logic complete with respect to the class of all game models?

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M. Pauly. *Logic for Social Software.* Ph.D. Thesis, University of Amsterdam (2001)..

Game Logic

Theorem Given a game logic formula φ and a finite game model \mathcal{M} , model checking can be done in time $O(|\mathcal{M}|^{ad(\varphi)+1} \times |\varphi|)$

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M. Pauly. *Logic for Social Software.* Ph.D. Thesis, University of Amsterdam (2001)..

D. Berwanger. *Game Logic is Strong Enough for Parity Games.* Studia Logica **75** (2003)..

Game Logic

Theorem The satisfiability problem for game logic is in EXPTIME.

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Game Logic

Theorem Game logic can be translated into the modal μ -calculus

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Game Logic

Theorem Game logic can be translated into the modal μ -calculus

Theorem No finite level of the modal μ -calculus hierarchy captures the expressive power of game logic.

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M. Pauly. *Logic for Social Software.* Ph.D. Thesis, University of Amsterdam (2001)..

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Game Algebra

Definition Two games γ_1 and γ_2 are **equivalent** provided $E_{\gamma_1} = E_{\gamma_2}$ in all models

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Definition Two games γ_1 and γ_2 are **equivalent** provided $E_{\gamma_1} = E_{\gamma_2}$ in all models (iff $\langle \gamma_1 \rangle p \leftrightarrow \langle \gamma_2 \rangle p$ is valid for a p which occurs neither in γ_1 nor in γ_2 .)

Game Algebra

Game Boards: Given a set of states or positions B , for each game g and each player i there is an associated relation $E_g^i \subseteq B \times 2^B$:

$pE_g^i T$ holds if in position p , i can force that the outcome of g will be a position in T .

- ▶ (monotonicity) if $pE_g^i T$ and $T \subseteq U$ then $pE_g^i U$
- ▶ (consistency) if $pE_g^i T$ then not $pE_g^{1-i}(B - T)$

Given a game board (a set B with relations E_g^i for each game and player), we say that two games g, h ($g \approx h$) are equivalent if $E_g^i = E_h^i$ for each i .

Game Algebra

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2. $(x; y); z \approx x; (y; z)$
3. $(x \vee y); z \approx (x; z) \vee (y; z)$, $(x \wedge y); z \approx (x; z) \wedge (y; z)$
4. $-x; -y \approx -(x; y)$

Game Algebra

1. Standard Laws of Boolean Algebras
2. $(x; y); z \approx x; (y; z)$
3. $(x \vee y); z \approx (x; z) \vee (y; z)$, $(x \wedge y); z \approx (x; z) \wedge (y; z)$
4. $\neg x; \neg y \approx \neg(x; y)$
5. $y \preceq z \Rightarrow x; y \preceq x; z$

Theorem Sound and complete axiomatizations of (iteration free) game algebra

Y. Venema. *Representing Game Algebras*. *Studia Logica* **75** (2003)..

V. Goranko. *The Basic Algebra of Game Equivalences*. *Studia Logica* **75** (2003)..

Concurrent Game Logic

$\gamma_1 \sqcap \gamma_2$ means “play γ_1 and γ_2 in parallel.”

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$\gamma_1 \cap \gamma_2$ means “play γ_1 and γ_2 in parallel.”

Need both the disjunctive and conjunctive interpretation of the neighborhoods.

Main Idea: $R_\gamma \subseteq W \times \wp(\wp(\wp(W)))$

J. van Benthem, S. Ghosh and F. Liu. *Modelling Simultaneous Games in Dynamic Logic*. LORI (2007).

More Information on Game Logic and Algebra

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R. Parikh. *The Logic of Games and its Applications..* *Annals of Discrete Mathematics*. (1985) .

J. van Benthem. *Notes on Logics and Games*. 2007.

Thank You!